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AFTER A.S.: PROPOSALS TO ALLEVIATE
PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN MAINE
Meredith K. Cook*
ABSTRACT
When someone presents to an emergency room with a mental illness manifesting
in danger to themselves or others, they can be admitted against their will on an
emergency basis to inpatient mental health care through a process colloquially
known as a Blue Paper application. However, when an inpatient bed is not
immediately available, patients are “boarded” against their will in emergency rooms
with little to no therapeutic care, sometimes for several weeks at a time before they
are transferred to inpatient care, or their condition stabilizes enough for them to be
discharged into the community.
In February 2020, a man identified to the public only by his initials, A.S., was
brought by law enforcement to LincolnHealth’s Miles Hospital Campus in
Damariscotta where he would stay against his will for a total of thirty days. He filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied, and appealed his case to the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, recognized that A.S.’s due process rights were abridged while at the same
time clarifying the legal procedures that allow others to be subjected to extended
periods of psychiatric boarding in emergency rooms across Maine.
This Note summarizes the historical and legal underpinnings of involuntary civil
commitment. It then explains the recent history of Maine’s involuntary commitment
statute that led to A.S.’s extended psychiatric boarding. This Note then provides a
detailed explanation of his case, A.S. v. LincolnHealth. It then analyzes the statutory
interpretation central to the holding of the case. Finally, this Note proposes several
short-term administrative and judicial actions that should be taken to alleviate the
problem of psychiatric boarding in Maine.
INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 2020, law enforcement officers brought a man, identified to the
public only by his initials, A.S., to the emergency department of LincolnHealth’s
Miles Hospital Campus in Damariscotta in apparent mental distress.1 After medical
staff determined that A.S. posed a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others due
to a mental illness, staff completed sixteen Blue Paper applications and detained him

* Master of Policy, Planning, and Management; University of Maine School of Law Class of 2023. I am
grateful to my Case Note advisor, Professor Jennifer Wriggins, for her support and guidance during this
process; to Emma Bond, Kevin Voyvodich, and James Bailinson for their advice and ideas for developing
this area of law; the Maine Law Review team for their time and attention to this piece; my family for their
support and words of motivation; and Marshall. To A.S., I hope you have found peace and safety. Finally,
I would like to thank all of my friends for always encouraging me to do my best work but to also take
time to enjoy life: Kelsey, Shannen, Sadie, Claire, Megan, Natasha, Dana, Kaylee, and so many more.
1. A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 1, 246 A.3d 157.

2022]

PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN MAINE AFTER A.S.

279

in the emergency room for thirty days against his will.2 A.S. was subjected to the
phenomenon known as psychiatric boarding, which occurs when a person in need of
inpatient mental health care is held in an emergency department while awaiting an
appropriate inpatient placement.3 He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
which the trial court denied despite the hospital’s failure to comply with the statutory
requirements for holding a person in the emergency room against their will.4 On the
thirtieth day of his involuntary detention, A.S. was released from the emergency
room and would later be vindicated by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as
the Law Court, when it vacated the trial court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition.5
Although the court announced that both the trial court and the hospital violated
statutory procedures and A.S.’s due process rights,6 it acknowledged that a legal
pathway exists that allows a person to be held in an emergency room for just as long
as A.S. was with minimal due process protections.7 To announce that pathway, the
court relied on a strained, but nevertheless understandable, statutory interpretation
given the court’s limited power to remedy the root causes of psychiatric boarding in
emergency rooms across Maine.8 After A.S., people with mental illness in Maine are
still at risk of experiencing extended periods of psychiatric boarding with only
modest due process protections. Section I of this Note will explore the historical and
legal underpinnings of involuntary civil commitment and the recent history of the
statute at issue in A.S. Section II will explain the issues and holdings of the case
itself and provide an analysis of the statutory interpretation central to the case.
Section III will discuss developments that came after the opinion was issued and
achievable short-term reforms to alleviate the instances and lengths of psychiatric
boarding in Maine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Involuntary Civil Commitment in the United States
When a person’s mental illness manifests in danger to themselves or others,
healthcare providers rely upon the process of involuntary civil commitment to admit
such persons to inpatient psychiatric hospitals.9 This is because refusal of psychiatric
care is a common occurrence among people with mental illness due to impaired
insight and judgment.10 An overview of the historical and legal underpinnings of

2. See id.
3. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1369 (2005) (“The term ‘boarding’ in this context refers
to the phenomenon of persons with mental disorders remaining in hospital emergency rooms while
waiting for mental health services to become available.”).
4. A.S., 2021 ME 6, ¶ 1, 246 A.3d 157.
5. Id. ¶¶ 8, 38.
6. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
7. See id. ¶ 25.
8. See id.
9. Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY
(EDGEMONT) 30, 31 (2010).
10. Id.
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civil commitment is crucial to understand the forces that brought A.S. to the
emergency room and kept him there for thirty days against his will.11
1. A Brief History of Mental Health Treatment: Founding Through
Deinstitutionalization
At the time of the founding of the United States, those with mental illness who
could not care for themselves and did not have family to support them were often
jailed or housed in poor houses with inhumane, unsanitary conditions and no
treatment for their mental condition.12 Beginning in the early 1800s and proceeding
through the middle of the 19th Century, reformers sparked a movement for more
humane treatment of people with mental illness, bringing care for the individual to
the center of mental healthcare policy for the first time in the United States.13 Four
privately funded asylums opened their doors in northeastern states between 1817 and
1824, followed by the establishment of state-run asylums, thus spurring the period
of institutionalization which proliferated for over a century.14 Although treatment
and care for individuals motivated the movement to institutionalization, the
“treatments” used in institutions were often ineffective, failed to prepare patients for
life outside the institution, and largely consisted of restraints, sedation, and
experimental drug treatments.15 The American eugenics movement of the early- to
mid-20th Century flourished in asylums.16 Of the more than 60,000 forced
sterilizations of the American eugenics period, many of them were performed in
institutions for the mentally ill, and many who were subjected to forced sterilization
were people of color.17 The only criteria for admission to mental institutions during
this period were the presence of mental illness and a need for care.18 There were

11. The process is also sometimes referred to as “involuntary hospitalization,” but this Note will use
the phrase “civil commitment” for consistency and clarity. See id.
12. Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment — The American Experience, 43 ISR.
J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCIS. 209, 209 (2006).
13. Id. at 210.
14. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 32. The first state-run institution, Worcester State Hospital, opened
in 1833. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 210.
15. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 32.
16. See Alexandra Minna Stern, That Time the United States Sterilized 60,000 of its Citizens,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sterilization-united-states_n_568f35f2e4b0c8
beacf68713 [https://perma.cc/T2JM-9K56].
17. See id. Carrie Buck, the “feeble-minded” woman at the center of Buck v. Bell, was committed to
the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded where she was ultimately sterilized. Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 205 (1927). Black women faced disproportionately higher rates of forced sterilization than
white women, black men, and white men. See Alexandra Minna Stern, Forced Sterilization Policies in
the US Targeted Minorites and Those with Disabilities – And Lasted into the 21st Century, UNIV. MICH.
INST. FOR HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION (Sept. 23, 2020), https://ihpi.umich.edu/news/forcedsterilization-policies-us-targeted-minorities-and-those-disabilities-and-lasted-21st [https://perma.cc/Q7
47-PD5A] (explaining that Black women in North Carolina, a prolific sterilization state, were the most
likely demographic group to be forcibly sterilized). In Maine, of the 326 total sterilizations performed
between 1925 and 1963, 189 were performed at the same location—Pineland Hospital (originally Maine
School for the Feeble-Minded) in New Gloucester, Maine. See Lutz Kaelber, Eugenics: Compulsory
Sterilization in 50 American States: Maine, UNIV. OF VT., https://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/eugenics/
ME/ME.html [https://perma.cc/XDV6-5B9W] (last visited May 11, 2022).
18. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 210.
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few, if any, procedural safeguards to prevent involuntary admission,19 and the system
was vulnerable to abuse by family members and physicians who forced sane people
into unnecessary hospitalization.20
Growing awareness of the abuses of civil commitment prompted states to enact
procedural safeguards similar to those afforded to criminal defendants, thus bringing
civil commitment under the purview of judicial process.21 However, by the late
1940s and early 1950s, advocates became concerned that the criminal-like
procedures would have adverse effects on the people subjected to them.22 This
concern led procedural policies to shift again in favor of medical providers as the
arbiters of commitment.23 At its peak in the 1950s, the population of psychiatric
inpatients in the United States exceeded 550,000.24 By the 1960s, public pressure to
reform the mental health system, the advent of antipsychotic medications, and
psychiatry’s embrace of community-based outpatient treatment converged to spell
the end of the institutionalization era.25
The Community Mental Health Act of 1963, signed into law by President John
F. Kennedy, became a vehicle for deinstitutionalization by providing the states with
funding to establish and operate 1,500 community mental health centers across the
country.26 From the signing of the Act through the 1990s, state hospitals shuttered
and the population of psychiatric inpatients plummeted to around 30,000.27
Although the hospitals closed and patients were transitioned into society, the robust
community mental health safety net the Act was intended to provide never came to
fruition.28 States only built approximately half of the 1,500 community mental health
centers called for by the Act.29 Oversight and regulation were particularly difficult
due to the heterogenous nature of the centers that were built, and many of the new
centers focused on the treatment of less-severe mental illnesses.30 The end result left
people with severe mental illness with few resources because no single organization
or authority was vested with the ultimate responsibility for their care.31 The aims of
deinstitutionalization were laudable, but its execution forced the severely mentally
ill into homelessness, jails, prisons, and acute care hospitals.32

19. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 32.
20. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 210.
21. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 32.
22. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 210-11.
23. Id.
24. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 32.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Blake Erickson, Deinstitutionalization Through Optimism: The Community Mental Health Act of
1963, 16 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY RESIDENTS’ J. 6, 6-7 (2021).
27. Testa & West, supra note 9, at 33.
28. See Erickson, supra note 26, at 7.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. The Legal Underpinnings of Civil Commitment
The movement for deinstitutionalization coincided with heightened admission
standards for civil commitment and more uniform procedural safeguards. States
began enacting statutes requiring a person to be mentally ill and present an imminent
threat of danger to oneself or others in order to be civilly committed.33 This marked
the abandonment of the need-for-treatment model of the institutionalization era in
favor of a dangerousness model.34
The procedural safeguards accompanying these statutes left open the question
of what standard of proof is necessary to commit a person for an indefinite period
while still satisfying due process guarantees. However, the Supreme Court
addressed this question in Addington v. Texas.35 The Court weighed the individual’s
liberty interest in not being involuntarily committed for an indefinite period of time
against the state’s interest in committing “the emotionally disturbed” with an eye
toward minimizing the risk of erroneous decisions.36 In considering these interests,
the Court observed that the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence
would “impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby
perhaps [] reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments [would] be ordered.”37
The Court also determined that “[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally
with society the risk of error [under the preponderance of the evidence standard]
when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible
harm to the state.”38 After making these observations, the Court ultimately held that,
at a minimum, the clear and convincing evidence standard was necessary to satisfy
due process because the “middle level [] burden of proof [] strikes a fair balance
between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state.”39 In so
holding, the Court rejected Addington’s assertion that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard should govern because the “concern that the risk of error to the individual
must be minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free” in the
criminal context does not apply in the civil commitment context.40 The Court
reasoned that “[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need
of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma.”41
B. Contemporary Civil Commitment in Maine
Current civil commitment laws in Maine largely reflect the procedural and
substantive principles discussed above and are embodied in statute in section 38633864 of title 34-B of the Maine Revised Statutes.42 Section 3863 outlines the
emergency procedure for people with mental illness manifesting in imminent risk of

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Testa & West, supra note 9, at 33.
Id.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1979).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 429.
Id.
See 34-B M.R.S. §§ 3863-3864 (2021).
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serious harm to oneself or others and section 3864 outlines the procedures for longerterm judicial commitment.43 Also relevant is section 3804, which authorizes the writ
of habeas corpus for those detained in a hospital for mental health reasons.44 The
following section of this Note will first outline the statutory requirements under
sections 3863 and 3864 and then consider the recent history of section 3863 leading
up to the decision in A.S.
1. Section 3863: Emergency Procedure (Blue Paper)
The procedure to admit a person to a psychiatric hospital on an emergency basis
begins with an application that must be endorsed by a justice or judge.45 This
application is known colloquially as the “Blue Paper.”46 The application can be made
by a health officer, law enforcement official, or any person,47 but is usually initiated
by hospital emergency rooms after a person in mental distress self-presents seeking
treatment or is brought to the emergency room by law enforcement or family in
apparent mental distress.48 The application must state “[t]he applicant’s belief that
the person is mentally ill and, because of the person’s illness, poses a likelihood of
serious harm; and . . . [t]he grounds for this belief.”49 The application must also be
supported by a certificate of examination by a medical practitioner, stating the
following:
A. That the practitioner has examined the person on the date of the certificate;
B. That the medical practitioner is of the opinion that the person is mentally ill and,
because of that illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm. The written certificate
must include a description of the grounds for that opinion. The opinion may be
based on personal observation or on history and information from other sources
considered reliable by the examiner, including, but not limited to, family members;
and
C. That adequate community resources are unavailable for care and treatment of the
person’s mental illness.50

The application and certificate are then reviewed by a judge or justice, and, if
the judge or justice is satisfied that they are “regular and in accordance with the law,”
the judge or justice will endorse the forms and promptly send the forms to the

43. See id.
44. 34-B M.R.S. § 3804 (2021).
45. Id. § 3863(1), (3).
46. See Me. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., State of Maine “Blue Paper” Application for Emergency
Involuntary Admission to a Psychiatric Hospital (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/sites/maine.
gov.dhhs/files/inline-files/Blue-Paper-MH-100.A%28Rev.-March-2021%29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G
JR-2RHY].
47. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(1).
48. See, e.g., A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 9, 246 A.3d 157; In re Christopher H., 2011 ME
13, ¶ 2, 12 A.3d 64; In re Penelope W., 2009 ME 81, ¶ 2, 977 A.2d 380.
49. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(1) (2021).
50. Id. § 3863(2).
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“admitting psychiatric hospital.”51 Once the certifying examination has taken place,
the person may be held in the hospital for up to twenty-four hours pending judicial
endorsement.52 At the end of this initial twenty-four hour hold period, if no suitable
placement has been found, the person may be held for another forty-eight hour period
so long as: (i) the hospital undertakes its best efforts to find an inpatient bed or
appropriate alternative; (ii) an appropriate evaluator concludes the person is mentally
ill and poses a likelihood of serious harm due to mental illness; and (iii) the hospital
notifies the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) of the individual’s
identity, presence, evaluation, and time of entry to the hospital.53 If, at the end of the
forty-eight hour hold, a suitable placement still is not secured, the person may be
held for one additional forty-eight hour period so long as the same requirements of
the first forty-eight hour period are met, and DHHS provides its best efforts to find
a placement.54 Notably, the statute is silent on what should happen if the second
forty-eight hour period elapses and no placement is found.55 Once an inpatient
psychiatric bed has been located and the patient has arrived at that location, the
inpatient hospital has three days from the date of admission to submit an application
for longer-term judicial commitment.56
2. Section 3864: Judicial Procedure and Commitment (White Paper)
Once a person is transferred to inpatient psychiatric care pursuant to a Blue
Paper application, if the inpatient hospital wishes to have the patient committed for
longer than three days, the hospital must submit an application under section 3863(5A)57 (known colloquially as the “White Paper”).58 Upon receipt of the White Paper
application, the district court must schedule an evidentiary hearing within fourteen
days of the application date.59 During this stage of the civil commitment process,
the hospital must comply with various notice and examination requirements.60 The
patient is entitled to be represented by court-appointed counsel at the commitment
hearing.61 For the court to enter an order of judicial commitment, it must find each
of the following by clear and convincing evidence:

51. Id. § 3863(3)(A). As acknowledged by the Law Court in A.S. v. LincolnHealth, the current reality
of inpatient psychiatric bed availability necessarily changes the process at this point. See A.S., 2021 ME
6, ¶ 16, 246 A.3d 157. Even if there is no psychiatric bed available at the time the application is submitted
for endorsement, the application must still be submitted to a judge or justice for their endorsement of the
application with the understanding that the applicant is still seeking an inpatient bed. See id. ¶ 37.
52. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3)(B) (2021).
53. Id. § 3863(3)(D).
54. Id. § 3863(3)(E).
55. See id. § 3863(3).
56. Id. § 3683(5-A)(C).
57. Id.
58. See Involuntary Admissions, STATE OF ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.
maine.gov/dhhs/obh/support-services/rights-and-legal-issues/involuntary-admissions [https://perma.cc/
96GU-NUXC] (last visited May 11, 2022).
59. 34-B M.R.S. § 3864(5)(A) (2021).
60. See id. § 3864(3)-(4).
61. Id. § 3864(5)(D).
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(1) . . . [T]hat the person is mentally ill and that the person’s recent actions and
behavior demonstrate that the person’s illness poses a likelihood of serious harm;
(1-A) That adequate community resources for care and treatment of the person’s
mental illness are unavailable;
(2) That inpatient hospitalization is the best available means for treatment of the
patient; and
(3) That it is satisfied with the individual treatment plan offered by the psychiatric
hospital to which the applicant seeks the patient’s involuntary commitment.62

If the court makes those findings, it may order commitment for a period of up to
four months in the first instance and up to one year in all subsequent hearings.63
3. Stuck Between the Sections: Psychiatric Boarding in Maine
Psychiatric boarding is the practice of holding patients in need of inpatient
psychiatric treatment involuntarily in emergency rooms until an inpatient bed is
available.64 Psychiatric boarding triggers legal problems in Maine when no
appropriate placement becomes available within the first 120 hours, which is the
duration that the emergency room is authorized by statute to hold a patient awaiting
admission to inpatient treatment.65 At such point, the statute is silent on what the
proper procedure is for continuing to hold a patient presenting a likelihood of serious
harm.66 The emergency room is under a federal legal duty to hold the patient until
they are transferred to appropriate care or stabilized,67 but the state statute appears to
support discharging the patient at the end of the 120-hour period unless the patient
agrees to stay voluntarily.68
It is difficult to know how often emergency rooms in Maine are being forced to
board patients because of limited inpatient bed availability and who is being
subjected to psychiatric boarding because DHHS does not publish such data and may
not even collect it.69 Even at the national level, data on the prevalence, length, and
demographics of psychiatric boarding is scant due to the lack of a standard definition
of emergency room boarding.70 Data from 2008, the most recent available, indicates
that 21.5% of all patients nationwide who presented to emergency departments with

62. Id. § 3864(6)(A).
63. Id. § 3864(7).
64. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1369 (2005).
65. See A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 16, 246 A.3d 157.
66. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3) (2021).
67. Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. The Act requires emergency
medical services to stabilize a patient’s emergency medical condition on site or transfer a person to a
facility where they will be stabilized regardless of the patient’s insured status or ability to pay. Id. §
1395dd(b).
68. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3) (2021).
69. See Data & Research, STATE OF ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.maine.gov/
dhhs/obh/about/data-research [https://perma.cc/L6NE-PMRD] (last visited May 11, 2022).
70. Jason M. Nolan et al., Psychiatric Boarding Incidence, Duration, and Associated Factors in
United States Emergency Departments, 41 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 57, 57-58 (2015).
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psychiatric complaints were boarded in the emergency room.71 Despite the lack of
more recent data, data points suggest the incidences are likely rising. For instance,
a 2016 survey revealed that nearly half of emergency physicians reported that daily
psychiatric boarding was occurring in their emergency departments more often than
it previously had.72 Additionally, in Maine, the number of White Paper filings in the
district courts rose from 893 in fiscal year 2016 to 1,190 in fiscal year 2020.73 A
study of emergency department visits from October 2014 to September 2015 in
Oregon found that 30.2% of all psychiatric emergency room visits resulted in the
patient being boarded while awaiting admission to inpatient treatment.74 This study
also found that certain demographic characteristics, such as age, race, and whether
the patient lived in an urban or rural setting were associated with a heightened
likelihood of psychiatric boarding.75 For example, Black patients were 2.7% more
likely to be boarded than white patients.76
Psychiatric boarding presents problems not just for the patients’ liberty and due
process rights, but also for their treatment and outcomes because psychiatric patients
who are boarded in emergency departments receive little, if any, therapeutic
treatment. Sixty-two percent of emergency department directors surveyed reported
that their departments provided no psychiatric services for boarded psychiatric
patients.77 Psychiatric patients boarded in emergency departments frequently
experience further deterioration to their mental health because of the loud and hectic
environment, and they are at higher risk of being subjected to chemical sedation and
physical restraints the longer they are boarded in an emergency department.78
Further, the prevalence of psychiatric boarding burdens the emergency healthcare
system as a whole. Boarding psychiatric patients strains limited emergency
department resources, which negatively impacts patient outcomes for all emergency
department patients, not just those presenting with psychiatric complaints.79
4. Recent History of Section 3863
The Law Court was presented with the issues of psychiatric boarding and the
statutory interplay between sections 3863 and 3864 of title 34-B of the Maine
Revised Statutes when it decided In re Marcia E. in 2012.80 In that case, the patient,
71. Jeremy R. Simon et al., The Impact of Boarding Psychiatric Patients in the Emergency
Department: Scope, Impact and Proposed Solutions, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (Nov. 2019),
https://www.acep.org/globalassets/new-pdfs/information-and-resource-papers/the-impact-of-psychiatricboarders-on-the-emergency-department.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4US-3NGG].
72. Id.
73. Maine State Court Caseload 5 Year Trend, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.courts.
maine.gov/about/stats/statewide.pdf [https://perma.cc/98HD-9ZJZ] (last visited May 11, 2022).
74. Jangho Yoon et al., Determinants of Boarding of Patients with Severe Mental Illness in Hospital
Emergency Departments, 23 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y & ECONS. 61, 63 tbl.1 (2020).
75. Id. at 64-66.
76. Id. at 66.
77. Simon et. al., supra note 71.
78. Id.
79. See B. A. Nicks & D. M. Manthey, The Impact of Psychiatric Patient Boarding in Emergency
Departments, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (July 22, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
3408670/ [https://perma.cc/2TP8-TKA2].
80. See In re Marcia E., 2012 ME 139, ¶ 3, 58 A.3d 1115.
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Marcia E., challenged the validity of her ultimate commitment to inpatient care under
section 3864.81 Marica E’s claim was based on the emergency department’s failure
to seek judicial endorsement for emergency admission within the first twenty-four
hours of holding her in the emergency department in violation of section 3863.82 At
the time, the statute did not authorize holding someone against their will for longer
than twenty-four hours.83 In its opinion, the Law Court stated that “[u]nder no
circumstances may a hospital hold a person against his or her will for longer than
twenty-four hours unless the hospital has obtained a judge’s endorsement.”84
Ultimately, however, the court held that the hospital’s failure to abide by the judicial
endorsement requirement to hold Marcia on an emergency basis did not defeat the
validity of her detention at the commitment phase because the procedures for each
were “separate and distinct.”85 The opinion implied that the remedy for a person
who is subjected to detention in the emergency department in violation of the
statutory time limit and procedure is to seek a writ of habeas corpus.86
Just over a year after In re Marcia E., Representative Richard Malaby introduced
L.D. 1738, An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes, to the
126th Maine Legislature on January 21, 2014.87 The bill proposed multiple reforms
to Maine’s involuntary commitment process, including amending section 3863 to
allow hospitals to detain a psychiatric patient for up to four days based solely on a
medical practitioner’s certificate with an additional three day period authorized
judicial endorsement.88 The bill’s sponsor, in his testimony to the Judiciary
Committee, indicated that he was motivated to introduce the bill in part because of a
Superior Court justice’s call for the legislature “to provide a more effective remedy
to mentally ill patients who are held in violation of state law, thus restoring a just
balance between the interests of individual liberty and public safety.”89 The bill was
met with opposition from mental health patient advocates90 and was eventually
passed as a resolution calling for the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court to convene a working group of various stakeholders and report reform
recommendations to the Judiciary Committee by the end of 2014.91
81. See id. ¶¶ 3-5.
82. Id. ¶¶ 1-5. Exactly why the hospital did not seek judicial endorsement within twenty-four hours
of Marcia’s detention is unclear from the opinion, but it appears that the hospital did not seek judicial
endorsement until it could accommodate her in inpatient care. See id. ¶ 2.
83. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3)(B) (2021).
84. In re Marcia E., 2020 ME 139, ¶ 6, 58 A.3d 1115.
85. Id. ¶ 9.
86. See id. ¶ 8.
87. L.D. 1738 (126th Legis. 2014).
88. Id. § 5.
89. An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1738 Before the
J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 126th Legis. 4 (2014) (testimony of Representative Richard Malaby,
sponsor of L.D. 1738).
90. See, e.g., An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1738
Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 126th Legis. (2014) (testimony of Oamshri Amarasingham,
Public Policy Council for the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine); An Act to Improve Maine’s
Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1738 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary,
126th Legis. 1 (2014) (testimony of Mark C. Joyce, Managing Attorney at Disability Rights Center (now
known as Disability Rights Maine)).
91. Resolves 2013, ch. 106.
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The working group convened in August 2014 and, after “discuss[ing] at length
the appropriate procedural safeguards to be applied when a patient is held in a
community hospital’s emergency department for more than 24 hours,” it
recommended lengthening the amount of time a psychiatric patient can be held
against their will.92 The working group suggested retaining the initial twenty-fourhour period but authorizing an additional forty-eight-hour period if inpatient care
could not be located in the first twenty-four hours, provided that the hospital made
additional certifications in writing.93 The group also recommended authorizing a
second forty-eight-hour period if, after the first seventy-two hours, the hospital still
could not find an appropriate placement but felt strongly that DHHS should step in
at that stage to help secure an appropriate placement.94 The working group appeared
to contemplate the second forty-eight-hour period as an extraordinary measure only
to be relied on in the rare circumstance that an inpatient bed could not be located in
the first seventy-two hours. Their report indicated that hospitals “should be able to
secure the necessary community resources or inpatient placements for most patients
within the extended timeframe proposed.”95 The report then went on to cite data
from DHHS’s Office of Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services showing that
only “approximately 3% of patients who were involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric hospital between July 2013 and October 2014 had been held in an
emergency department for greater than 72 hours before an inpatient placement was
secured” to justify recommending the final forty-eight-hour holding period.96
The working group’s recommendations were embodied in L.D. 1145, An Act to
Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Process, which was introduced to the
127th Maine Legislature by Representative Richard Malaby on March 31, 2015.97
In his testimony to the Judiciary Committee, Representative Malaby stated that the
purpose of the bill was to address the problem in the then-existing statute of what
should happen to a boarded psychiatric patient when they reach the end of the
twenty-four hour holding period.98 He further indicated that the extended holding
periods were intended as an interim solution to the longer-term problem of inpatient
psychiatric bed availability.99 This version of Representative Malaby’s bill was
passed into law,100 and the measures were incorporated into the version of the statute
at issue in A.S. v. LincolnHealth.101

92. Judicial Branch Mental Health Working Group, Recommendations for Improving the Involuntary
Commitment Process 4-5 (Dec. 15, 2014).
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. L.D. 1145 (127th Legis. 2015).
98. An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1145 Before the
J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. 1 (2015) (testimony of Representative Richard Malaby,
sponsor of L.D. 1145).
99. Id. at 2.
100. P.L. 2015, ch. 309 (emergency, effective July 2, 2015).
101. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3)(B)-(E) (2021). Newly effective legislation provided some updates to
this section of the statute, but these updates are irrelevant for the purposes of this Note. See id. § 3863(7);
L.D. 868 (130th Legis. 2021) (striking references in the statute to “physician or licensed clinical
psychologist” and replacing them with “medical practitioner”).
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II. A.S. V. LINCOLNHEALTH
A. Facts and Procedural Background
On February 24, 2020, law enforcement officers brought A.S. to the emergency
department of LincolnHealth’s Miles Hospital in Damariscotta where the staff
apparently concluded that A.S. met the criteria for emergency involuntary admission
to inpatient psychiatric treatment.102 Despite having completed sixteen Blue Paper
applications beginning on February 24, the hospital did not seek judicial
endorsement of any of the Blue Papers, believing that the statute did not require
endorsement until the admitting hospital had been identified.103 According to the
hospital, this is because the judicial officer could not endorse the application or send
it to the admitting hospital if such hospital had not been identified.104 LincolnHealth
conceded that there was no case law to support this interpretation of the statute, “but
told the court that this ‘practice . . . has been occurring . . . for several years . . .
without any licensing violations being issued by [the] Department of Health and
Human Services or any other entity objecting to this practice.’”105
On March 13, 2020, the eighteenth day of his detention in the emergency
department, A.S. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County
Superior Court seeking release from the hospital, and the hearing was scheduled for
March 20, 2020.106 Before the start of the hearing, the parties submitted a set of
stipulated facts—including the fact that LincolnHealth never submitted any of the
sixteen Blue Paper applications to the court—and before the start of evidence, A.S.
moved for judgment on the stipulated record, arguing that the appropriate remedy
for his unlawful detention was release.107 The Superior Court denied his request, and
LincolnHealth proceeded to present evidence of the efforts it had undertaken to find
A.S. an appropriate inpatient placement during his detention in the emergency
room.108 At the close of LincolnHealth’s case, A.S. moved for judgment as a matter
of law on the basis that LincolnHealth had not complied with section 3863(3) of title
34-B of the Maine Revised Statutes by failing to seek judicial endorsement of its
actions.109 Although the Superior Court was sympathetic that A.S. had been detained
for such a long period without any court proceedings, it denied A.S.’s motion.110
After A.S. testified and all evidence was presented, the trial court made several
findings and conclusions of law on the record. First, “the court concluded that the
section 3863 process ‘can be reset every 48 hours, based upon a new Blue Paper
being completed.’”111 The Superior Court then went on to state that “‘the proper
standard’ for adjudicating a habeas petition pursuant to section 3804 ‘is whether as

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶¶ 1-2, 246 A.3d 157.
Id. ¶¶ 2, 17.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
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of now, an application for emergency involuntary admission to a psychiatric hospital
could be granted, and basically whether the Blue Paper criteria could be met.’”112
The Superior Court then found that the Blue Paper standard had been met by the
evidence, and although the Superior Court did not specify which standard of review
it applied in coming to this conclusion, it was clear to the Law Court from the record
that the Superior Court had rejected the argument that a heightened standard should
apply.113 The Superior Court even stated on the record that, had it applied the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard, it would have had a harder time denying A.S.’s
habeas petition.114 A.S. timely appealed the Superior Court’s decision, and was
ultimately discharged from LincolnHealth’s emergency department on March 25,
2020, while his appeal was still pending.115 A.S. spent a total of thirty days in the
emergency room.116
B. The Issues
The Law Court considered a total of five issues in its review of A.S.’s detention
and habeas petition on appeal: (i) mootness, (ii) standard of review on appeal, (iii)
application of section 3863, (iv) availability of habeas relief, and (v) due process and
the standard of review for involuntary hospitalization.117 For purposes of this Note,
the analysis of the application of section 3863 is of primary importance, so the other
four issues and holdings will be considered briefly before proceeding to the statutory
application analysis.
Because A.S. was released from the hospital while his appeal was pending, the
court first considered whether to proceed to the merits of his appeal or to dismiss the
appeal as moot due to the absence of an effective remedy.118 While the court
recognized that the appeal was moot because A.S. was discharged and there was no
real or effective relief the court could provide, it proceeded to the merits because the
case presented questions of great public concern.119 Further, the injury was capable
of repetition yet evading review, “because the process used by LincolnHealth is
apparently used frequently by Maine’s nonpsychiatric hospitals when those hospitals
are forced to ‘board’ psychiatric patients.”120 The court acknowledged that Maine’s
nonpsychiatric hospitals and the courts dealing with those hospitals are in need of
guidance in this area.121
The court then determined which standard of review it should apply to trial court
adjudications of “civil” (i.e., noncriminal) habeas petitions on appeal.122 The court
announced that, after considering the standard of review of habeas petitions in the
criminal context, and conducting a comparative analysis of the standard of review in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Id.
See id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
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other jurisdictions, it would apply the abuse of discretion standard to appeals of civil
habeas petitions going forward.123 Thus, the court reviewed the Superior
Court’s “legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its
ultimate determination for abuse of discretion.”124
The court also considered the showings required for habeas relief and the
remedies available in the mental health context.125 Generally, a court considering a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus looks simply to the causes of the imprisonment
or restraint and hears evidence produced on either side, and the court will order the
patient to be discharged if it finds there is no legal cause for such detention.126
However, in mental health cases, the court’s considerations must go beyond the strict
legality of the restraint and consider the welfare of both the patient and the public to
determine whether a writ of habeas corpus is appropriate.127 The court’s holding
clarified that trial courts should first determine the legality of a hospitalization and
then consider its remedial options, and tailor any relief to balance the individual’s
liberty interests with concerns for the safety of the individual and the community.128
The court then offered an example of such a remedy, suggesting that courts could
grant the writ of habeas corpus but stay the petitioner’s release for twenty-four hours
to give the hospital time to seek judicial endorsement of a Blue Paper application.129
Because the trial court first determined that A.S. posed a risk of serious harm and
denied the habeas petition based on that determination, it did not properly apply the
habeas jurisprudence to A.S.’s situation.130
A.S. argued that the trial court violated his right to due process when it applied
a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than a clear and convincing
evidence standard, to determine that he posed a likelihood of serious harm to himself
or others and justify his continued detention in the emergency department.131 In
response, the hospital argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard was
not required because A.S.’s detention was based on an emergency admission
application which mandates only that the application be “regular and in accordance
with the law” for a judge or justice to endorse it.132 Under a de novo standard of
review, the court agreed that A.S.’s due process rights had been violated by the
application of the less demanding evidentiary standard.133 Because the length of time
he had been detained at the time of the habeas hearing—twenty-five days—was so
serious a deprivation of liberty, the fact that it was based on an application for
emergency admission rather than one for involuntary commitment was not
controlling.134 The court acknowledged that “[a]lthough a section 3863(3) judicial
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Id. ¶ 13-14.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 26-30.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
See id. ¶¶ 29-30.
Id. ¶ 30.
See id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 35.
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endorsement may authorize a hospital to detain an individual for up to 120 hours,
A.S.’s detention far exceeded that limit, and even exceeded the duration of any
commitment permissible without a hearing.”135 Thus, moving forward, courts
presented with a similar factual situation should apply the clear and convincing
evidence standard to determine whether detention should continue.136
At the “crux of this appeal” was the proper application of the statute that
authorizes emergency involuntary admissions, section 3863 of title 34-B of the
Maine Revised Statutes.137 The court reviews statutory interpretation de novo,
looking “first to the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning if [the
court] can do so while avoiding absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.”138 As part
of the plain language review, the court looks to the “entire statutory scheme in order
to achieve a harmonious result.”139 The court examines legislative history to
determine legislative intent only if the meaning of the statute’s plain language,
considered with the entire statutory scheme, is unclear.140
The court began “by noting that section 3863 is an imprecise ‘fit’ for what is
actually happening in Maine’s emergency departments as they struggle to deal with
patients who need psychiatric beds at a time when the State has failed to create or
fund enough of those beds.”141 A.S. argued that the hospital violated the statute by
failing to submit any Blue Paper applications for judicial endorsement and by
detaining him for longer than the statutorily authorized 120 hours.142 The hospital’s
counterargument was that it had fulfilled its statutory duties by repeatedly filling out
the Blue Paper application and periodically having a medical practitioner complete
certifying examinations of A.S.143 The hospital contended that, because it was
unable to identify an admitting inpatient hospital bed for A.S., it could not submit
the application for judicial endorsement because the judicial officer could not
endorse the application as “regular and in accordance with the law” if no inpatient
placement had been identified.144 Similarly, the officer could not promptly send the
application and examination certificate to the admitting hospital if no hospital had
been secured.145
The court’s analysis started with its interpretation of the previous version of
section 3683(3) where, in deciding In re Marcia E., it announced that “[u]nder no
circumstances may a hospital hold a person against his or her will for longer than
twenty-four hours unless the hospital has obtained a judge’s endorsement.”146 The
court then noted the legislative history that changed the statute to allow for the two

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
See id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 17, 34.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19 (quoting In re Marcia E., 2012 ME 139, ¶ 6, n.3, 58 A.3d 1115).
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additional forty-eight hour hold periods.147 “Three years after [Marcia E.], in
response to concerns that, due to Maine’s severe shortage of psychiatric beds, section
3863(3)(B)’s emergency twenty-four-hour hold provided insufficient time for a
nonpsychiatric hospital to locate a psychiatric bed for a patient in crisis, paragraphs
(D) and (E) of section 3863(3) were enacted.”148 To support this assertion of
legislative intent, the court cited, inter alia, the testimony of the Maine Hospital
Association in support of the bill that initiated the change to the statute.149 The court
went on to conclude that because the 2015 amendments did not change the statutory
language of section 3863(3)(B)(2),150 hospitals seeking to detain people pending
admission to inpatient psychiatric treatment must still obtain judicial endorsement
within the first twenty-four hours of such detention.151 The court rejected
LincolnHealth’s interpretation of the statute that there are no due process protections
for patients at the Blue Paper stage because the due process protections of section
3684 do not “kick into full effect” until a person is involuntarily admitted into a
psychiatric hospital.152 To support rejecting LincolnHealth’s argument, the court
noted that such an interpretation was not supported by the language of the statute nor
the case law.153 The court went one step further by referencing legislative intent
stating that it could not “accept the premise that . . . the Legislature intended to allow
individuals to be held in emergency departments for days or weeks without any legal
process or safeguards,” but then went on to stress that the language of the statute is
unambiguous.154 Thus, even though the application is technically incomplete
without identifying an inpatient psychiatric bed for the person to be detained,
hospitals still must seek judicial endorsement within the first twenty-four hours of
detention to be in compliance with the law.155
The court then interpreted the statute to determine what hospitals can legally do
if, as in the case of A.S., the statutorily authorized 120 hours run out and the person
still poses a likelihood of serious harm.156 Using plain language interpretation, the
court announced that “[i]f the patient cannot be safely released after the entire 120hour authorized hold period has lapsed and if there is still no psychiatric bed
available, the hospital may ‘restart’ the process.”157 To properly restart the process,

147. Id. ¶ 20.
148. Id.
149. Id.; An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1145 Before
the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2015) (testimony of Jeffrey Austin, on behalf of the
Maine Hospital Association).
150. “A person may not be held against the person’s will in a hospital under this section, except that a
person for whom an examiner has executed the certificate under subsection (2) may be detained in a
hospital for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 24 hours, pending endorsement by a judge or justice,
if: . . . (2) For a person sought to be involuntarily admitted under this section, the person or persons
seeking the involuntary admission undertake to secure the endorsement immediately upon execution of
the certificate by the examiner.” 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3)(B)(2) (2021).
151. A.S., 2021 ME 6, ¶ 21, 246 A.3d 157.
152. Id. ¶ 24.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. ¶¶ 21-24.
156. See id. ¶ 25.
157. Id.
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the hospital must complete “a new application and certifying examination, including
adequate and updated information relevant to the individual at that moment in time,
[and] submit[] [it] for judicial endorsement within twenty-four hours after the 120hour period ends.”158 The court supported this interpretation by noting that there is
nothing in the statute that prohibits the restarting practice.159 It then elaborated on
that point in a footnote, first acknowledging that the statute is silent on what should
happen to the person after the first 120 hours elapse, then stating “but if the
Legislature intended that the hospital must discharge that patient, it would have
expressed that intention in that portion of the statute, just as it did in section 3863(5A).”160 That section requires psychiatric hospitals to file a White Paper application
with the district court within the first three days that a person is admitted to the
hospital pursuant to a Blue Paper application or else discharge the patient.161
C. Holdings and Ultimate Disposition of the Case
Finally, the court wrote a summary of its holdings to clarify the processes
hospitals must follow to comply with section 3863 and the procedure trial courts
must follow when presented with a habeas petition arising from detentions in an
emergency room.162 This case clarified that, even if an emergency room seeking to
have a patient admitted to inpatient care has not yet located an inpatient bed, the
hospitals must seek judicial endorsement of the application within the first twentyfour hours of holding that patient.163 Once the application has been endorsed by a
judicial officer, the hospital may continue to hold that patient for two additional
forty-eight hour periods provided that the hospital follows the additional steps called
for by the relevant statute.164 To properly decide the appropriateness of a habeas
petition and provide any relief, trial courts must first evaluate the legality of the
restraint and then order a tailored, appropriate remedy.165 When the detention is
lengthy, as in the case of A.S., the hospital has the burden of persuading the court by
clear and convincing evidence that continued hospitalization is necessary.166
Because LincolnHealth failed to submit a single Blue Paper application to the court,
A.S.’s detention was unlawful, and the trial court should have declared the detention
unlawful and then determined an appropriate remedy.167 Thus, the Law Court
vacated the judgment of the trial court denying A.S.’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.168
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Id. ¶ 25 n.6.
Id.
See id. ¶¶ 37-38.
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D. Analysis and Critique: Section 3863
The court’s opinion in A.S. v. LincolnHealth essentially endorses the practice of
psychiatric boarding with only the barest procedural protections for patients held in
the emergency room for longer than 120 hours against their will,169 but the court was
working with few viable options in the absence of legislative guidance. It is clear
that the protection provided to boarded patients is minimal under the court’s opinion.
A judicial officer reviewing an application for emergency involuntary admission
must endorse the application if it is “regular and in accordance with the law,” leaving
little to no room for discretion, and the basis for endorsement comes from only the
hospital’s assertion of facts.170 While the exigency of a person who poses a
likelihood of serious harm to themselves or others presenting at the emergency room
justifies this procedure in the early days of detention, it is unclear why these bare
procedural safeguards should be sufficient beyond the statutorily authorized 120
hours. Further, it is a strained reading of the statute and statutory scheme to say that
restarting the Blue Paper application process every 120 hours indefinitely is not
prohibited by the law.
A plain language reading of the statute, of course, cannot end by observing that
the statute is silent on what hospitals should do when they have held a patient against
their will for the full 120 hours who still poses a likelihood of serious harm, but has
not been accepted for an inpatient psychiatric bed. However, the result the Law
Court reached is arguably inconsistent when considered in context with the statutory
scheme. As the court itself acknowledges, by the time of A.S.’s hearing on his
habeas petition, “A.S.’s detention far exceeded that [120 hour] limit, and even
exceeded the duration of any commitment permissible without a hearing.”171 Section
3863(5-A) requires the inpatient hospital seeking commitment longer than three days
to submit the commitment application to the district court within the first three days
or release the patient.172 The district court must hold a hearing within fourteen days
of receipt of the application.173 Altogether, this shows that the Legislature
contemplated a period of no longer than twenty-two days that one may be
hospitalized against their will without being able to have their case and evidence
considered by a judge.174
Even under this calculation, the patient who has been held against their will and
then admitted to psychiatric inpatient care is afforded more due process protections
upon their arrival and subsequent commitment (White Paper) application than a
patient who is being boarded against their will in an emergency room. For example,
169. See id. ¶ 25.
170. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(3)(A) (2021).
171. A.S., 2021 ME 6, ¶ 35, 246 A.3d 157 (emphasis added).
172. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(5-A)(C) (2021).
173. Id. § 3864(5)(A).
174. The twenty-two day calculation assumes that a person waits the entire 120 hours in the emergency
room (five days), the admitting hospital waits the entire three days to submit the application, and the court
does not schedule a hearing until the fourteenth day after receiving the application. The actual period one
could lawfully wait without having a hearing could exceed twenty-two days because the statute does allow
for additional time to file the application if the third day falls on a weekend or holiday. Id. § 3863(5A)(C). And the district court may continue the hearing for an additional twenty-one days but only for
good cause shown. Id. § 3864(5)(A)(1).
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upon admission to inpatient care, the psychiatric hospital must consult with the
patient and then provide notice of their hospitalization to an appropriate emergency
contact, though no such notification requirement exists at the Blue Paper stage.175
Every patient admitted under section 3863 must be evaluated by a staff medical
practitioner “as soon as practicable” after admission and within twenty-four hours,
and if the second opinion of that practitioner does not agree with the emergency room
that the patient poses a likelihood of serious harm, the patient must be discharged.176
Moreover, before the White Paper application can be filed, the hospital must
inform the patient and their guardian or next of kin of the patient’s right to hire
counsel or have counsel appointed, their right to select themselves or have their
attorney select an independent examiner, and how they can contact the district
court.177 The hospital must submit proof of these notifications to the district court
with the application, and the court must, within two days of filing, send notification
of the filing to the patient.178 The court will order another examination before the
hearing and if the person does not obtain counsel on their own, the court must appoint
counsel.179 In the intervening time between the White Paper application and the
hearing, the court may order discharge to a guardian or next of kin upon request,
upon a report of the hospital applicant that the person may be discharged safely, or
upon writ of habeas corpus.180 Although the person has not yet had an opportunity
to present their evidence and be heard, they are afforded significantly more due
process protections as soon as they arrive at inpatient care than if they are boarded
in the emergency room beyond 120 hours.
In the context of the entire statutory scheme, it is inconsistent to interpret the
statute’s plain meaning to allow for indefinite “restarting” of the emergency
involuntary application process every 120 hours until the patient is admitted to
inpatient care or no longer imposes a likelihood of serious harm. The entire
involuntary hospitalization statutory scheme provides for “stepped up” due process
protections and requirements for hospitals that increase as the length of the
involuntary hold increases. It is inconsistent and illogical for these stepped-up
procedures to step back down every 120 hours when the Blue Paper process is
“restarted.” This is especially so given the significant disparity of due process
protections required between the Blue Paper phase and the White Paper phase.
Given the absurdity of the result of the plain language reading of the statute, the
Law Court should have proceeded to fully consider legislative intent to properly
interpret the statute and provide guidance to hospitals moving forward.181 The
Judicial Branch Mental Health Working Group’s report to the Judiciary Committee
would have been particularly instructive of legislative intent. This is because the

175. Compare 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(6)(A)-(E) (requiring notice to patient’s next of kin upon admission
to inpatient care), with 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(1)-(5-A) (establishing that notice to next of kin is not required
at the Blue Paper stage).
176. 34-B M.R.S. § 3863(7)-(7-A) (2021).
177. Id. § 3864(1)(D)(1)-(3).
178. Id. § 3684(1)(E), (3)(A)(1).
179. Id. § 3864(4), (5)(D).
180. Id. § 3864(2)(A)-(C).
181. As discussed above, the court did at least acknowledge the legislative history that led to the
statutory changes relevant to its decision. A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 20, 246 A.3d 157.
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working group was deputized to undertake the policy analysis by legislative resolve,
its members were selected and appointed by the Chief Justice, and its membership
represented various stakeholders from state government, hospitals, patients’ rights
advocates, and affected family members.182 While the working group was also silent
on what should happen if its recommended 120 hour period ran out while the patient
was still in the emergency room, its recommendations make clear that it did not
intend for emergency rooms to be able to hold a patient involuntarily longer than 120
hours.183 In the working group’s explanation of its recommendation for the second
forty-eight hour hold period, it wrote “while hospitals should be able to secure the
necessary community resources or inpatient placements for most patients within the
extended timeframe proposed above, circumstances might arise where necessary
resources do not become available as quickly as they are needed.”184 The working
group recommended authorizing the second forty-eight hour period based on DHHS
data that only 3% of patients who were involuntarily admitted to psychiatric hospitals
waited in emergency rooms for longer than seventy-two hours before admission.185
Additionally, with each recommended forty-eight hour holding period, the working
group recommended stepped up procedural safeguarding requirements to ensure that
patients were being evaluated by someone with “heightened psychiatric expertise,”
and that DHHS would lend its “expertise and assistance to the hospital.”186 The
working group’s recommendations advocate for heightened due process
requirements as the length of involuntary detention increases. The indefinite
“restarting” of the Blue Paper application process is inconsistent with the working
group’s concerns. Further, not one piece of testimony offered on the bill that initiated
the statutory changes advocated for authorizing a total holding period of more than
120 hours.187 If the Law Court had fully considered legislative intent as part of its
statutory interpretation, its holding that hospitals could simply “restart” the Blue
Paper application process could not stand.
Although the court’s reading of the statute is strained to get to the statutory
interpretation that it announced, the interpretation is understandable given the
context and the court’s limited authority to craft a solution wholesale without
legislative guidance. It would be hard to defend an interpretation that required the
emergency room to release a patient after 120 hours regardless of whether the patient
still posed a likelihood of serious harm, and would likely put emergency rooms at
182. See Judicial Branch Mental Health Working Group, Recommendations for Improving the
Involuntary Commitment Process 1 (Dec. 15, 2014).
183. See id. at 4-5.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 4-5.
187. See, e.g., An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1145
Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2015) (testimony of Representative Richard
Malaby, sponsor of L.D. 1145); An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes: Hearing
on L.D. 1145 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2015) (testimony of Jeffrey
Austin, Maine Hospital Association); An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary Commitment Processes:
Hearing on L.D. 1145 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2015) (testimony of
Mark Joyce, Managing Attorney of Disability Rights Maine); An Act to Improve Maine’s Involuntary
Commitment Processes: Hearing on L.D. 1145 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis.
(2015) (testimony of Dr. Michelle Gardner, Medical Director, Dorothea Dix Psychiatric Center).
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risk of violating their duty to stabilize or transfer patients under the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act.188 Further, because of the silence of the statute
on the appropriate course of action at the end of the 120 hours, the court would
essentially be legislating new procedures without the benefit of the deliberative
legislative process. The court was also put in a tough position, as it noted, because
“the State has failed to create or fund enough [inpatient psychiatric] beds.”189
Although the creation of more psychiatric beds certainly could alleviate emergency
room boarding, the problem runs much deeper than just inpatient capacity. DHHS
has licensed 500 inpatient psychiatric beds, but many of the bed licenses remain
unused,190 so the underlying issue is not the failure to create more beds. Systemic
solutions should focus on community mental health resources to prevent the extreme
and stigmatizing option of involuntary commitment, but any type of systemic
solution that would prevent hospitalization is beyond the court’s reach.
III. AFTER A.S.: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
As discussed above, the mental health care system is in crisis due to the
competing forces of deinstitutionalization and the lack of effective and readily
available community mental health services. The large-scale, long-term solutions
that would keep people from reaching a crisis point requiring hospitalization are
beyond the scope of this Note, but helpful developments have arisen after A.S. and
this Note proposes several short-term and easily achievable solutions that would
reduce the instances and lengths of psychiatric boarding in Maine.
A. Recent Developments
Just over a month after the Law Court issued its opinion in A.S. v. LincolnHealth,
DHHS published a new Blue Paper form and a supplemental form to reflect the
holdings of the case and the realities of psychiatric boarding.191 The new Blue Paper
form contains separate fields for judicial endorsement when a psychiatric hospital is
identified in the application and for when a psychiatric hospital has not yet been
identified.192 For hospitals facing the latter situation, DHHS published a
supplemental form to be submitted to the court as a follow up once a psychiatric
hospital has been identified.193 These new forms are a better fit for the situation
188. See Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
189. A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 16, 246 A.3d 157.
190. Joe Lawlor, Sanford Medical Center Opening Psychiatric Center to Help Ease Shortage,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.pressherald.com/2020/10/20/sanford-medicalcenter-opening-psychiatric-center-will-help-ease-shortage/ [https://perma.cc/5RQ6-8CEF].
191. Me. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Memo re: Revisions to Forms for the Emergency
Involuntary Hospitalization Process (March 2, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/sites/maine.gov.dhhs/
files/inline-files/noticification-re-new-Blue-Paper-forms-3-2-2021-signed_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PA
M-JWDT].
192. Me. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., State of Maine “Blue Paper” Application for Emergency
Involuntary Admission to a Psychiatric Hospital (March 1, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/sites/
maine.gov.dhhs/files/inline-files/Blue-Paper-MH-100.A%28Rev.-March-2021%29_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PSJ3-X7MY].
193. Me. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., State of Maine “Blue Paper” Notification to Judicial Officer
of Identification of Psychiatric Hospital (March 1, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/sites/maine.gov.
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emergency rooms are facing and resolve the confusion that LincolnHealth and other
hospitals were experiencing before A.S. by making clear that even if a psychiatric
hospital has not been identified, a hospital must still seek judicial endorsement within
the first twenty-four hours of detention. In addition to the new, more appropriate
forms, if a hospital is “restarting” the Blue Paper application process because the
statutorily authorized 120 hours has expired, the hospital “must attach and provide
all immediately preceding Blue Paper applications for the proposed patient to the
judicial officer.”194 By including the preceding Blue Paper applications in the
subsequent “restarting” applications, the endorsing judicial officer is put on notice
that the patient is being subjected to an extended detention and may afford the
subsequent “restarted” Blue Paper applications heightened scrutiny.
B. Proposals for the Future
Although large-scale systemic changes to the mental healthcare system are
necessary to prevent the extreme liberty deprivation of inpatient hospitalization,
these changes will need to come from the state and federal legislatures with the
advocacy of stakeholders and are beyond the scope of this Note. There are, however,
easily attainable short-term measures that can increase the due process rights of
people with mental illness in Maine and reduce the instances of extended detentions
in emergency rooms. These reforms include greater transparency and appointment
of counsel.
1. Transparency
The involuntary admission and commitment processes are shrouded in secrecy,
in part to protect patients’ identities, but there are areas for improvement that do not
implicate patient privacy. As discussed above, data on psychiatric boarding is not
published by DHHS but appears to be within its purview to collect and publish if it
chooses to.195 Such data, if collected and made public would help policy makers
should they consider making further changes to the statute, to increase due process
protections for people subjected to extended emergency room detentions. Armed
with this data, advocates would be able to demonstrate the scope of the problem to
persuade policy makers to take up the charge. Also, if the data contained
demographic information, it would expose any disparities in psychiatric boarding
instances and lengths among demographic groups.
Beyond data transparency, greater transparency of admissions standards to
inpatient psychiatric care and inpatient bed availability would help emergency rooms
understand how to effectively advocate for getting patients admitted, thereby
decreasing boarding times in emergency rooms. As it stands, few of the inpatient

dhhs/files/inline-files/Blue-Paper-Notification-MH-100.B%28March-2021%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP
Y8-L3H2].
194. Me. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., State of Maine “Blue Paper” Application for Emergency
Involuntary Admission to a Psychiatric Hospital (March 1, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/sites/
maine.gov.dhhs/files/inline-files/Blue-Paper-MH-100.A%28Rev.-March-2021%29_0.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X7FC-JCLV].
195. See Recommendations for Improving the Involuntary Commitment Process 5 (Dec. 15, 2014).
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hospitals make their admissions criteria or open bed capacity publicly available.196
DHHS does not appear to publish a unified database of current inpatient bed
availability,197 but such a database would be an efficient way for emergency room
staff to monitor appropriate inpatient openings.198 Further, inpatient psychiatric
hospitals are not under the same obligation to treat and stabilize patients as
emergency rooms,199 leaving them relatively unconstrained in their discretion to
decline patients in need of care. The discretionary nature of inpatient admission is
likely a driving force behind the psychiatric boarding crisis and cuts against any
solution that simply adds more beds to the state because the addition of more beds
would be meaningless if the people who need them are not accepted for admission
to psychiatric hospitals. DHHS should leverage its licensing power200 to create a
more unified, transparent admissions system and limit the inpatient psychiatric
hospitals’ ability to decline patients. The legislature should also consider codifying
admission standards for inpatient psychiatric care and limiting hospital discretion by
statute.
2. Appointment of Counsel
Appointment of counsel for patients held in emergency rooms who wish to
challenge their detention is arguably required by the Law Court’s holding in In re
Penelope W.201 In that case, the court held that the involuntary commitment statute
requires that the person who is the subject of a petition for involuntary commitment
“be provided counsel at every stage of the proceeding.”202 Counsel is required
because such proceedings “inevitably involve substantial questions regarding the
mental status of the person who is the subject of the application.”203 Thus,
“[p]ermitting such persons to proceed without the benefit of an attorney runs the risk

196. See, e.g., Adult Inpatient Psychiatric Unit (A-3), ST. MARY’S HEALTH SYS., https://www.stmarys
maine.com/departments-services/mental-health-detox/adult-inpatient-psychiatric-unit-(a-3)
[https://
perma.cc/6Z3R-7WEF] (last visited May 11, 2022); Behavioral Health, CENT. ME. MED. CTR., https://
www.cmhc.org/cmmc/services/behavioral-health/ [https://perma.cc/JY9L-3BLZ] (last visited May 11,
2022). But see SPRING HARBOR HOSP., Adult Inpatient Services: Admission Criteria, https://www.maine
health.org/Spring-Harbor-Hospital/Services/Adult-Inpatient [https://perma.cc/2FTB-T8QQ] (last visited
May 11, 2022).
197. See Data & Research, STATE OF ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.maine.gov/
dhhs/obh/about/data-research [https://perma.cc/2DVV-FEUA] (last visited May 11, 2022).
198. The Massachusetts Behavioral Health Partnership administers the Massachusetts Behavioral
Health Access platform, a website accessible by the public and service providers with up to the minute
information on mental health service openings, including open inpatient psychiatric beds. Mental Health
Services, MASS. BEHAV. HEALTH P’SHIP, https://www.mabhaccess.com/MH.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6
6B-RVLW] (last visited May 11, 2022). DHHS or a private hospital system should consider building a
similar platform for Maine to assist emergency room staff as they search for inpatient placements.
199. See Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b), (e)(5) (establishing that
the requirement for hospitals to stabilize or transfer applies only to emergency medical services).
200. See Licensing & Certification: Medical Facilities: Hospitals, STATE OF ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/dlc/licensing-certification/medical-facilities/hospitals [https:
//perma.cc/NBC8-2JNE] (last visited May 11, 2022).
201. In re Penelope W., 2009 ME 81, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 380.
202. Id. ¶ 7.
203. Id. ¶ 10.
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of giving those who may be incompetent the task of proving their own
competence.”204
The same policy justifications that support mandatory appointment of counsel
at the involuntary commitment stage also weigh in favor of appointing counsel at the
habeas petition stage. This is because a patient filing a habeas petition must advocate
for their own competence after they have been alleged to be incompetent.205
Unfortunately, the judicial branch has declined to give guidance on whether counsel
will be appointed for patients filing a habeas petition because doing so would amount
to an advisory opinion.206 Because the judicial branch will not issue an advisory
opinion on whether counsel is required when a patient wishes to file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, the legislature should amend section 3804 of title 34-B of the
Maine Revised Statutes to make clear that counsel is required when requested for
this purpose.
Appointed counsel at the habeas petition stage is only useful to the extent that a
patient knows of the availability of such a proceeding and remedy.207 When a patient
is subjected to extended emergency room detention beyond the statutorily authorized
120 hours, they should at least be informed of their rights and given contact
information for advocacy organizations and the courts. To this end, the Law Court’s
opinion in A.S. supports the need for appointed counsel after the statutorily
authorized 120 hours has expired because the person’s detention becomes indefinite
at that point.208 Moreover, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Addington v. Texas,
a patient who is subject to involuntary commitment proceedings for an indefinite
period of detention is afforded heightened due process protections.209 Further, under
the Law Court’s holding in In re Penelope W., a patient who is subject to such
proceedings must be represented by counsel at every stage of those proceedings.210
Considered together, the holdings in these three cases compel the conclusion that
patients subjected to extended emergency room detentions are being held
indefinitely, and thus must be provided counsel. While boarded patients face an
uphill battle for a writ of habeas corpus to be granted, the presence of appointed
counsel and the filing of the habeas petition can put needed pressure on the system
to get a patient admitted to inpatient care or released into the community when
appropriate.

204. Id.
205. See A.S. v. LincolnHealth, 2021 ME 6, ¶ 27, 246 A.3d 157.
206. Letter from James T. Glessner, State Ct. Adm’r, Admin. Off. of the Cts. to Mark Joyce, Managing
Att’y, Disability Rts. Me. & Emma Bond, Legal Dir., Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Me., (Mar. 17, 2021)
(on file with author).
207. In A.S., the only reason A.S.’s extended detention in the emergency room came to light was
because he already had appointed counsel on an unrelated matter who learned of his detention and filed
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Zoom Interview with James P. Bailinson, Corp. Couns.,
MaineHealth (Feb. 18, 2022).
208. See A.S., 2021 ME 6, ¶ 25, 246 A.3d 157 (interpreting the statute to allow for indefinite
“restarting” of the Blue Paper process).
209. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
210. In re Penelope W., 2009 ME 81, ¶ 7, 977 A.2d 380.

302

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

CONCLUSION
The due process rights of patients with mental illness who experience significant
deprivations of their liberty due to involuntary hospitalization are considered
important by the Supreme Court,211 but exactly how to protect those rights while
balancing the state’s interest in public safety in light of limited resources has proven
difficult in practice. While the entire mental healthcare system is in need of reform,
A.S. v LincolnHealth brought attention to the need for short-term reforms that will
protect the due process rights of boarded emergency room patients in Maine. Efforts
to reform the system should first look to transparency in data collection and
admission criteria and the appointment of counsel. Long-term goals should include
improving access to community-based mental health services and modifying section
3863 of title 34-B of the Maine Revised Statutes to include stronger due process
protections for vulnerable patients.

211. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.

